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Introduction 
 The majority of the writing that seriously uses the term “New Sincerity” as a description 
of a current in contemporary American literature and the other arts exists only on the internet.  
For the most part, this body of work amounts to a handful of self-published blog posts written 
mostly by young writers of fiction or poetry.  As a whole, this small collection fails to provide a 
really cohesive idea of what such a movement consists in, which is unsurprising.  Art movements 
are probably always hard to pin down while they are actually happening, since experimentation 
is what makes them new movements.
1
  In the most general sense, the term seems to describe art 
and cultural practices that 1) eschew cynicism, the belief that humans are by nature selfish and 
dishonest, and 2) are highly conscious of irony, rejecting its role as a dominant postmodern mode, 
yet at the same time not necessarily doing away with its use altogether.  
 New Sincerity as an idea is highly compelling to me on a personal level.  Given that I 
mainly hear the term used by my peers, I believe that its appeal is generational, meaning that its 
examination may provide insight into the particular condition of young Americans today.  In this 
paper I will attempt to investigate the idea of New Sincerity, its motivations, characteristics, and 
cultural significance.  I will begin with a discussion of the cultural conditions that give rise to 
projects of New Sincerity.  In order to consider how New Sincerity in fiction may experiment 
with narrative formats, I will then discuss what the formal qualities of narrative genres serve to 
communicate.  Finally, I will investigate what an attempt at New Sincerity in American fiction 
might look like in practice with an analysis of Infinite Jest by David Foster Wallace. 
I 
 In his 1993 essay “E Unibus Pluram: Television and US Fiction,” David Foster Wallace 
                                                 
1
Though imagine my surprise upon finding one blogger casually opining in a post from 2010 that New Sincerity is 
already “over now, I guess” (Gallaher). 
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describes the emergence of “irony as a cultural norm” (184) in the United States.  Irony can mean 
several different things, but Wallace is primarily concerned with the rhetorical strategy of 
intentionally “saying what is contrary to what is meant” (Colebrook 1).  Rhetorical irony is not 
meant to be deceptive, for if it isn't recognized by its audience, it doesn't work.  The utility of the 
device lies in its potential to demonstrate a thought's flaws in practice, which in some cases may 
be more effective than a plain-spoken critique; as the common writing advice goes, “show, don't 
tell.”  Voltaire's Candide successfully uses irony in this way to critique Leibneizian optimism.  
The absurdity of the protagonists' cheerful declarations and passivity in the face of seemingly 
endless historically-inspired horrors is apparent without being openly stated.  The resulting satire 
is rhetorically successful because the ridiculousness of Leibneiz' philosophy is made viscerally 
understandable to the reader. 
 It doesn't hurt that Candide's use of irony is also really funny, a fact that serves doubly in 
the novella's rhetorical favor.  First, a humorous tone avoids suggesting despair as the work's 
logical conclusion, which is a very relevant concern for an argument against optimism.  Second, 
the humor just makes for more engaging and memorable reading.  Ironic critique is often 
amusing.  It exposes the absurd and ridiculous, and those things tend to make people laugh.  Still, 
its ultimate goal is exposure, not humor; the latter is a byproduct. 
 Wallace notes the presence of such ironic critique in American art of the 1960s, 
describing it as “socially useful” and “productive” for exposing hypocrisy in dominant culture in 
service of a belief “that etiology and diagnosis pointed toward cure; that revelation of 
imprisonment yielded freedom.”  He contrasts such “frankly idealistic” (183) use of irony and 
ridicule with his analysis of these devices' post-1960s transformation into “agents of great 
despair and stasis in US culture” (171).  This transformation, Wallace says, is an effect of the rise 
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of the corporate interest-driven televisual entertainment industry.   Effective entertainment and 
advertising capture viewers' attention, and in order to do this they try to appeal to audience 
sensibilities and provide novelty.  This strategy leads to a tendency to absorb cultural beliefs and 
practices, emptying them of their original meaning in order to appeal to a mass audience.  
Televisual entertainment itself is a major force in the production of widespread cultural beliefs 
and practices, implicitly presenting itself as a source of information about how people look, talk, 
and behave.  Appropriating strategies of ironic critique from '60s counterculture purely for their 
entertainment value, ironic gestures become embedded in American culture as they are depicted 
more and more as models of the way people interact with one another.  Wallace explains that this 
effect creates a positive feedback-loop of social anxiety and isolation: 
To the extent that TV can flatter [the viewer] about ‘seeing through’ the 
pretentiousness and hypocrisy of outdated values, it can induce in [the viewer] 
precisely the feeling of canny superiority it’s taught him to crave, and can keep 
him dependent on the cynical TV-watching that alone affords this feeling.  And to 
the extent that it can train viewers to laugh at characters’ unending put-downs of 
one another, to view ridicule as both the mode of social intercourse and the 
ultimate art form, television can reinforce its own queer ontology of appearance: 
the most frightening prospect, for the well-conditioned viewer, becomes leaving 
oneself open to others’ ridicule by betraying passé expressions of value, emotion, 
or vulnerability.  Other people become judges; the crime is naiveté. (180-1) 
 According to Wallace, the “exclusively negative function” of irony has valuable potential 
as a “ground-clearing” in a reprehensible cultural situation, but is “singularly unuseful when it 
comes to constructing anything to replace the hypocrisies it debunks” (183) and therefore 
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insidiously destructive when taken as an unremitting position towards reality.  He locates the 
oppressiveness of ironic culture in its neutralization of all critique through its “ability to interdict 
the question without attending to its content” (184).  In her 1999 book No Logo, Naomi Klein 
gives an account of the tendency of mass entertainment and advertising to appropriate beliefs and 
practices of cultural rebellion, emptying them of their original significance in order to sell 
products: 
What were indeed subversive messages in the sixties—“Never Work,” “It is 
Forbidden to Forbid,” “Take Your Desires for Reality”—now sound more like 
Sprite or Nike slogans: Just Feel It.  And the “situations” or “happenings” staged 
by the political pranksters in 1968, though genuinely shocking and disruptive at 
the time, are the Absolut Vodka ad of 1998—the one featuring purple-clad art 
school students storming bars and restaurants banging on bottles. (283) 
 In appropriating a practice of critique, mass entertainment and advertising can at once 
enjoy the glamor of a false association with rebelliousness while deflecting the actually 
rebellious critiques made against them.  Culture jamming, “the practice of parodying 
advertisements and hijacking billboards” (280) with the aim of exposing corporate behavior, 
often uses irony to demonstrate its points.  The anti-consumerist publication Adbusters creates a 
glossy image of the Marlboro Man riding into the sunset with another cowboy over the caption “I 
miss my lung, Bob”;2 performance artist Jubal Brown and his friends draw skulls over the faces 
of emaciated models in fashion ads all over Toronto.
3
  Klein points out that while these types of 
techniques do have potential to send a striking message, in practice they end up becoming 
inspiration for ad agencies with depressing frequency.  She notes that “after a while, what began 
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 Miss My Lung. 
3
 Klein 286. 
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as a way to talk back to the ads starts to feel more like evidence of our total colonization by them, 
and especially because the ad industry is proving that it is capable of cutting off the culture 
jammers at the pass.  Examples of pre-jammed ads include a 1997 Nike campaign that used the 
slogan ‘I am not/A target market/I am an athlete’ and Sprite’s ‘Image is Nothing’ campaign” 
(298).   
 Ad agencies in the ‘90s found this simulation of the rebellious image of culture 
jamming—minus the original anti-consumerist goal—can be quite lucrative.  In these ads’ 
imitation of the techniques of ironic critique to parody themselves, actual critiques first aimed at 
the ads are often de-clawed.  Klein highlights this effect with the story of an “aggressively ironic” 
(299) ad campaign for Diesel jeans.  “One of the most popular ways for artists and activists to 
highlight the inequalities of free-market globalization is by juxtaposing First World icons with 
Third World scenes” such as “an obviously malnourished Haitian girl wearing Mickey Mouse 
glasses” or “Indonesian students rioting in front of McDonalds arches.”  Diesel successfully co-
opts the style of these political messages with a campaign that 
features ads within ads: a series of billboards flogging a fictional Brand 0 line of 
products in a nameless North Korean city.  In one, a glamorous skinny blonde is 
pictured on the side of a bus that is overflowing with frail-looking workers.  The 
ad is selling “Brand 0 diet—There’s no limit to how thin you can get.”  Another 
shows an Asian man huddled under a piece of cardboard.  Above him towers a 
Ken and Barbie Brand 0 billboard. (298) 
 In the four years after this campaign was first launched, Diesel’s U.S. sales increased by 
over $20 million.  Culture jammers attempt to create cognitive dissonance in order to change 
individuals’ attitudes and behavior, but according to Klein “the real truth is that, as a culture, we 
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seem capable of absorbing limitless amounts of cognitive dissonance” (296) from mass media, 
and particularly on television.  Perhaps this is because, as Wallace notes, television as a medium 
  revolves off just the sorts of absurd contradictions that irony's all about exposing.   
It is ironic that television is a syncresis that celebrates diversity.  That an 
extremely unattractive self-consciousness is necessary to create TV performers' 
illusion of unconscious appeal. That products presented as helping you express 
individuality can afford to be advertised on television only because they sell to 
huge hordes. And so on...Television both fears irony's capacity to expose, and 
needs it. (161) 
 By the ‘90s, TV came to necessarily embrace such contradictions in order to keep 
Americans paying as much attention as possible—at that time, to the tune of six hours a day on 
average.
4
  Humorously parodying its own contradictions with ads making fun of hackneyed 
advertising gimmicks or programs riffing on their own predictable formats invites jaded viewers 
to feel congratulated for their own boredom and dissatisfaction with the medium, soothing their 
self-consciousness about giving it such a huge fraction of their waking hours.  Take, for example, 
That '70s Show, a popular sitcom from the late '90s and early 2000s.  The show is mediocre, with 
bad acting, corny jokes, and an obnoxious laugh track, but its presentation as a parody of '70s 
television makes its predictability part of the joke itself, an asset instead of a flaw.   
 Probably the most irritating part of That '70s Show is its treatment of the character Fez, a 
foreign exchange student whose comic appeal is tied to his status as a naïve and perpetually 
confused outsider.  A running joke throughout the series is that no one knows what country he is 
actually from, though he speaks Spanish occasionally.  This itself is pretty telling—a lot of the 
white Americans who constitute the show's target audience think that everywhere south of the 
                                                 
4Wallace, “E Unibus Pluram” 151. 
Morris 8 
 
border is culturally homogenous.  Fez's role is born of a paradigm that views white people as 
default humans, while black and brown people are just variations within a generic category of 
“other.”  The jokes that revolve around Fez are by and large racist, but the sitcom's status as a 
period piece can assuage any audience discomfort by implying that the show isn't really making 
fun of his perceived cultural background, but of '70s TV's racist attitudes themselves, buying into 
the disturbingly common mythology that racism is America is over and everyone (read: white 
people) can all laugh about it now.  That '70s Show subtly gives viewers the choice between 
laughing at it or with it depending on their individual sensibilities.  The strategy demonstrates the 
utility of ironic gestures for courting mass appeal, but it also shows how mass media's use of 
irony can protect the status quo; in the end, Fez is still a racist caricature and a token in an 
otherwise all-white cast, and the paradigm remains. 
  Any experience one has for six hours every day is going to play a part in shaping one's 
perception of and interaction with the world outside of that experience.  Even if the viewer does 
not agree with a message espoused by television or advertising, constant exposure to the message 
still makes it a part of the viewer's reality in some way.  At the very least the viewer is given an 
impression that the messages are popularly accepted, which is going to affect the viewer's 
assumptions about how to interact with others.  For example, while a particular viewer might 
fully believe that the media holds up an absurdly unhealthy and unrealistic body type as its 
beauty ideal, this belief alone may not negate the effect of that beauty ideal on the viewer’s life.  
Perceiving from media that this body type is what most people will view as attractive, the viewer 
might easily still worry that his or her failure to achieve this body type will lead to social 
rejection.   
 Wallace saw '90s televisual culture training viewers for those six hours per day to put up 
Morris 9 
 
with cognitive dissonance and to constantly take a position of ironic detachment.  Carried into 
real life, this training has sobering social and political implications.  Consider what David 
Harvey describes as the “emphatic turn towards neoliberalism in political-economic practices 
and thinking since the 1970s.”  Harvey defines neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong 
private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”  The theory's instantiation has been marked 
by increasing “deregulation, privatization, and withdrawal of the state from many areas of social 
provision” (2-3).  Harvey makes a convincing argument that neoliberal theory in practice is 
inconsistent with its own values, because 
a contradiction arises between the seductive but alienating possessive 
individualism on the one hand and the desire for a meaningful collective life on 
the other.  While individuals are supposedly free to choose, they are not supposed 
to choose to construct strong collective institutions (such as trade unions) as 
opposed to weak voluntary organizations (like charitable organizations).  They 
most certainly should not choose to create political parties with the aim of forcing 
the state to intervene in or eliminate the market.  To guard against their greatest 
fears—fascism, communism, socialism, authoritarian populism, and even majority 
rule—the neoliberals have to put strong limits on democratic governance, relying 
instead upon undemocratic and unaccountable organizations (such as the Federal 
Reserve or the IMF) to make key decisions.  This creates the paradox of intense 
state interventions and government by elites and “experts” in a world where the 
state is supposed to not be interventionist. (69) 
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 Neoliberalism is then at its heart, Harvey argues, a conduit for securing class power, and 
to that end a driving force of “increasing authoritarianism” (81) in the United States and 
elsewhere.  Its contradictory rhetoric carries a serious dose of cognitive dissonance.  It's not 
unthinkable that a culture known to give knee-jerk acceptance to advertising's empty use of anti-
consumerist messages is likely to give knee-jerk acceptance to a political rhetoric based on 
emptied-out terms like “freedom” and “choice.”  Where irony as a rhetorical strategy is aimed at 
exposing hypocrisy, irony as a cultural norm allows hypocrisy to flourish, nourished by 
conditions of widespread complacency, cynicism, and what amounts to a lot of really lazy 
thinking. 
 * 
 Wallace's essay is now twenty-one years old, which is also my age.  Today's America is, 
of course, not identical to that of 1993, but some key aspects of Wallace's cultural diagnosis 
speak to my own life experience.  Especially relevant is his analysis of the interplay between 
everyday use of televisual technology and experiences of social anxiety and loneliness.  Wallace 
characterizes television's effect on its viewers as “malignantly addictive” (163).  His choice of 
phrase may sound extreme given that even the most devoted TV-viewers do not vomit, sweat, or 
shake when deprived of their entertainment for a few days, but Wallace's idea of “addiction” is a 
bit different in that he uses the word to refer to a psychological dependency rather than a physical 
one. 
by ‘malignant’ and ‘addictive’ I…do not mean evil or coercive.  An activity is 
addictive if one’s relationship to it lies on that downward-sloping continuum 
between liking it a little too much and downright needing it.  Many addictions, 
from exercise to letter-writing, are pretty benign.  But something is malignantly 
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addictive if (1) it causes real problems for the addict, and (2) it offers itself as 
relief from the very problems it causes. (163) 
 If '90s Americans really watched TV for six hours per day on average, there is probably a 
reason for it that goes beyond the medium's entertainment value.  Most people do not want 
themselves to watch that much television; I do not have a statistic to back that statement up, but 
surely it is not unreasonable to say that when asked what their goals are in life, not many adults 
will answer that they want to afford themselves as much time to watch television as possible.  
And yet this TV-watching often displaces time that Americans would like themselves to spend 
working on their goals instead. 
 Wallace's explanation for the excessive screen time is that many Americans are lonely 
and socially anxious.  Certainly a great portion of American society is set up in a way that 
facilitates aloneness.  Living in the suburbs often requires driving to get anywhere, and children 
with busy parents may spend a lot of their time outside of school playing alone if they do not 
have friends on their street.  My own mother worried openly over the fact that I did not have 
many friends over when I was a kid, an issue that I had little understanding of at the time.  I 
remember worrying that our house was not very fun for my friends, because we didn't get 
Nickelodeon cartoons on our TV, or have Fruit Roll-Ups and Oreos in the pantry, or a Fisher-
Price swing set in the backyard (I definitely knew all of these brand names in elementary school), 
or a lot of the other things that middle-class American parents often bought for their kids in the 
1990s. 
 It is not a coincidence that my childhood social anxieties were so wrapped up in 
commercial messages about what was fun or desirable.  I do not believe that my experience is at 
all uncommon among my peers.  The American economic system is dependent on creating 
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feelings of inadequacy and want.  Happy, healthy, satisfied people are a little too busy enjoying 
their time on earth together with their basic needs met to be depended on to do frequent 
extraneous shopping.  Isolated, self-loathing or insecure individuals are much more vulnerable to 
an advertisement’s claim that this or that product will make life more fun, more meaningful, will 
increase their own personal value as defined by televisual culture—in Wallace’s words, “the 
ultimate arbiter of human worth.  An oracle, to be consulted a lot” (176).  To create this 
unhappiness and establish false needs, the oracle finds the most success in pushing impossible 
standards of personal value.  For example, a woman watching television may receive the 
message that her worth is correlated with how well she conforms to the aforementioned virtually 
improbable body shape, at once boyishly thin and femininely curvy.  If she is thin she can be sold 
padded bras, and if she is not, then she can be sold diet products.  TV and ads often encourage 
the viewer to find something to dislike about themselves, and capitalize on that insecurity with 
false promises of solutions.  With advertising this is probably a more intentional manipulation, 
while with TV programs the feelings of inadequacy may be more a byproduct of all the 
characters being unusually beautiful and interesting.  Americans are exposed to these 
manipulative messages essentially from birth.  Children have little ironic sensibility and are 
trusting of ads' friendly and authoritative voices.  They just absorb the explicit and implicit 
messages they receive from the way others around them behave.  In a 2011 survey, over a third 
of boys and girls in grades three to six said they had tried to diet at least once, and about half 
were unhappy with their weight.
5
  American adults are not manipulated by advertising because 
they are unintelligent, but rather because most ads necessarily play off a whole set of insecurities 
and desires that are built into the basic assumptions about reality that many Americans form in 
childhood.  This all sounds pretty sinister, but it is important to note that the whole situation is 
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 Haupt. 
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not some villainous mastermind's orchestration, but an inherent side effect of a competitive 
capitalist economy. 
 Advertising often encourages Americans to be socially insecure and worried about the 
impression they make on others, to expect judgments of inadequacy.  Given that it is so easy for 
many people to achieve aloneness—maintaining a professional distance from co-workers is in 
many cases not unusual, and outside of work many individuals can just return to a private 
room—the socially anxious often choose to maintain that solitude.  Nevertheless, choosing 
solitude does not mean that the socially anxious do not feel lonely.  Wallace points out that TV is 
a pressure-free stand-in for the desire to be with other people, as well as a tempting source of 
information on how to interact with others successfully for those who feel unsure.  Simply put, it 
lets the viewer watch others without being seen.  Wallace's argument is then pretty simple: 
If it’s true that many Americans are lonely, and if it’s true that many lonely people 
are prodigious TV-watchers, and if it’s true that lonely people find in television’s 
2D images relief from the pain of their reluctance to be around real humans, then 
it’s also obvious that the more time spent watching TV, the less time spent in the 
real human world, and the less time spent in the real human world, the harder it 
becomes not to feel alienated from real humans, solipsistic, lonely. (163) 
 Essentially, televisual entertainment, when consumed for hours daily, displaces time spent 
practicing in-person social skills.  Like any skill, social skills come with practice and familiarity 
with one's cultural territory.  Lack of social skills can lead to social anxiety, which makes it 
pretty tempting to stay home and watch more TV—or, to use TV as a way to spend time with 
others.   
 Silencing opposition to the status quo is not a new development in today’s United States, 
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nor was it one in Wallace’s 1990s.  Hegemonic cultures throughout history operate, consciously 
or otherwise, to render challenging voices silent.  What is so uniquely frightening about the 
current situation is that the technology that has come to play such a major role in the silencing is 
more powerful and embedded than ever.  Screen-based technology has changed in the years since 
Wallace wrote “E Unibus Pluram,” but if anything, many Americans have become more 
dependent on these technologies to either facilitate or replace social interaction.  Home internet 
access became ubiquitous during my early childhood, making my generation the first in all 
human history to have no memory of life without it.  The huge popularity of social media 
platforms seems like evidence of a continued widespread desire to combat loneliness.  These 
tools allow for social interaction among people otherwise isolated in their homes; at the same 
time, they provide a barrier that allows one to craft a more “perfect” public image of oneself.  
When instant messaging clients like AOL and MSN became available, my friends and I would 
spend hours every evening typing at each other from our respective homes.  IM provided a 
relatively low pressure way to interact with other kids, because it facilitates conversation without 
having to be seen or heard, and allowed much more time to construct what one wants to say.  IM 
is less popular now, having given way to more complex social media like Facebook and Twitter.  
Still, the basic preference among people my age is still to initiate contact via some form of text in 
most situations, at least partially because written communication allows for more careful 
construction of the message being sent. 
 It's not that there is something inherently wrong with enjoying a show or movie with 
friends, or sending a text message.  The issue is that televisual technology has a constant and 
pervasive hold on my generation's interactions with one another.  Social media, web surfing, and 
video games have displaced a significant chunk of TV time, but the total amount of time spend in 
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front of an electronic screen has held steady or even increased.  My generation of Americans 
averages more than seven and half hours each day
6
 looking at screens of electronic devices, 
meaning that we give more time to televisual technology use than to any other activity in our 
waking hours.  About half of that time is devoted to entertainment.
7
  And millennials now 
average less than seven hours of sleep per 24-hour period, meaning that elective screen time is 
cutting into the time allotted for a really necessary form of bodily care, which makes the 
“malignant addiction” description seem a little more fitting.  The more that time spent directly 
interacting is displaced by consuming media together or apart, the less comfortable people tend 
to become with direct conversation.  Shared experiences form the ways that friends interact with 
one another, establishing customs and ways of communicating.  As young Americans’ shared 
experiences increasingly consist in what media they consume together, their speech and behavior 
with friends becomes increasingly modeled off of those mass-produced experiences that they 
share and less off of unique, self-directed interactions. 
 Dependence on mass media to facilitate togetherness indirectly amounts to a 
homogenizing third-party mediation of interaction, which is eery considering that said third party 
is commercially motivated.  And my generation is really dependent on media.  If we are not 
consuming it together, we are often talking about it, and if we aren't talking directly about it, it's 
often still informing our basic worldview and speech and sense of humor.  Throughout this 
section I have been concerned with describing a systemic silencing of opposition to the status 
quo, but I want to point out that dependence on televisual tech can lead to a literal silencing.  
People my age, even close friends, are by and large uncomfortable talking to each other about 
really emotionally or spiritually weighty topics, and are so skilled at steering conversations out 
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of such territory with jokes that they seem to do this reflexively.  There is a sense in which many 
young adults are in a process of recovery from trauma, just now learning how to identify and 
confront their emotions.  Irony as a cultural attitude makes it easy to name things we reject, but is 
much less conducive to committing to a positive set of values, or even discovering what those 
values might be. 
* 
 In the two decades after “E Unibus Pluram,” irony as a cultural norm has become a 
common subject of discussion.  One of the most telling signs of this heightened awareness is the 
current understanding of the “hipster” in popular imagination.  It is telling that the defining 
archetype of middle-class American youth alternative culture is not an alternative culture at all, 
but a neutralized semblance of one.  Decorated with symbols that in the past connoted some 
values that deviated from or challenged the mainstream, the hipster endorses none of these 
beliefs and treats them and their associated practices and products as mere entertaining 
commodities.  Such a person is the theoretical embodiment of “postmodern rebellion become 
pop culture institution” (184) that Wallace sees in advertising and televisual entertainment’s 
appropriation of art and alternative culture.  The hipster uses techniques of irony constantly to 
create a possibility of distance from anything he or she says or does, avoiding claiming 
responsibility and thus attempting to remain immune to ridicule. 
Also telling is that unlike various 20
th
 century terms describing archetypes of past US 
counterculture—such as “beatnik,” “hippie,” “punk,” etc—“hipster” has positive connotations to 
virtually no one, especially those most likely to experience being labeled as such.  The word is 
derogatory and even accusatory in virtually every instance of its use even though there is 
widespread disparity from person to person as to who qualifies as a hipster.  To those not 
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immersed in alternative culture, a hipster might be any young middle-class American who 
appears to deviate from a perceived mainstream lifestyle.  In this view, a young person who does 
not use social media, or listens to music outside of Top 40, or even just prefers to cook his or her 
own meals from scratch might be accused of hipsterdom.  To the mainstream, the hipster is just a 
self-congratulatory weirdo who wears cool clothes and whose presence makes one feel self-
conscious about one’s own social status and herd-like behaviors.  To participants in the 
counterculture, the hipster is a foolish poseur who appropriates practices and appearances of 
rebellion without understanding or caring to learn about them, a mainstream would-be tourist of 
the underground if only the hipster could find the way down there.  Such a person threatens to 
negate alternative culture’s resistance to the mainstream.  When practices and appearances of 
rebellion become popular signifiers of “coolness,” the presence of any actual subversive activity 
is rendered less visible because the signs that once indicated it have been emptied of that 
significance by mass culture.  Where once mainstream America was reminded of subversive 
activity by the unusual appearances of some youth on the street, now looking unusual is not 
necessarily symbolic of one's political values, and no longer provokes the same reaction from 
mainstream culture.   
The “normal”/“alternative” binary is itself a falsehood of advertising.  Marketing aims to 
divide a population into identity-specific niches to encourage more individual purchasing and 
target consumers more effectively.  For example, marketing some shampoo as intended for one 
gender identity or another might encourage a man and woman living in the same house to each 
buy their own bottle instead of just sharing one.  Some products are similarly marketed to signify 
an identity that is “alternative” or “normal” when in fact all of the products fit inside the same 
dominant framework.  The binary, along with a popular fashion based on mashing together the 
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symbols of different countercultural movements into a single “look,” obscures the diversity of 
alternative cultures that exist in the US and boils “alt” down to mean “looks interesting” in 
popular usage.
8
 
But if the mainstream thinks the hipster is whatever fits its watered-down conception of 
rebelliousness, and the counterculture thinks a hipster is essentially a participant of the 
mainstream, who are the actual hipsters?  The discrepancy reveals the myth for what it is: 
hipsters as they are imagined do not exist.  Hipster behavior abounds in terms of clueless cultural 
appropriation in advertising, entertainment and fashion and in consumption of the resulting 
products, but in terms of individuals no one seems to fully embody the descriptions promulgated 
in popular media.  Take for example this pretty typical description from a 2012 New York Times 
op-ed piece called “How to Live Without Irony”: 
The hipster is our archetype of ironic living…the hipster haunts every city street 
and university town. Manifesting a nostalgia for times he never lived himself, this 
contemporary urban harlequin appropriates outmoded fashions (the mustache, the 
tiny shorts), mechanisms (fixed-gear bicycles, portable record players) and 
hobbies (home brewing, playing trombone). He harvests awkwardness and self-
consciousness. Before he makes any choice, he has proceeded through several 
stages of self-scrutiny. The hipster is a scholar of social forms, a student of cool. 
He studies relentlessly, foraging for what has yet to be found by the mainstream. 
He is a walking citation; his clothes refer to much more than themselves. He tries 
to negotiate the age-old problem of individuality, not with concepts, but with 
material things. 
                                                 
8
 On the other hand, maybe the general “alt” label may have the effect of creating a feeling of solidarity among 
otherwise disparate subcultures that could potentially increase their support of one another in collective political 
action. 
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 The writer, Princeton professor Christy Wampole, expresses the entirely popular opinion 
that hipsters “produce a distinct irritation in me,” confessing that “they provoke me, I realized, 
because they are, despite the distance from which I observe them, an amplified version of me…I, 
too, exhibit ironic tendencies.”  Wampole probably means well, but her spark of self-awareness 
here is left embedded in a cynical perception of deeper cynicism in others, rationalizing that, no 
matter how strong her own dependence on irony to get through life in post-modern America, 
there is someone out there who is way more guilty of the same, guilty to the point of deserving 
an epithet that she is at pains to declare her own “distance” from.  This declaration is made 
despite her awareness that “scoffing at the hipster” is “a favorite hobby, especially of hipsters.”   
Wampole’s derision for the hipster is poorly aimed: turbans and native American 
ceremonial garb are some significant examples of actually offensive cultural appropriation by 
mass-market Western fashion in recent years.  Who cares if white people of the 2010s want to 
revisit white fashions of the 1970s as inconsequential and historically inconstant as hemlines and 
facial hair?  Fixed-gears and portable record players hurt no one, and they along with home-
brewing and (really) playing a musical instrument are all choices that might result from being 
really deeply interested in something.  If today's crop of young people feel a need to resort to an 
air of ironic detachment towards hobbies in order to deal with fear of judgment in a culture that 
condemns pretty much all uncommon recreational activities as a statement of snotty superiority 
over “normal” past-times (like consuming televisual entertainment), that’s pretty sad, perhaps 
immature, but kind of understandable.   
“Hipster” is a dehumanizing term.  It asserts that another person’s existence is 
meaningless by his or her own fault, that his or her way of interacting with the world, the 
interests and knowledge and skills that one perceives as defining his or her identity are just an act.  
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The popularity of the word seems to demonstrate a widespread annoyance with irony as a 
cultural norm.  But the term's use also demonstrates the continued power of the media to distort 
and empty cultural criticisms, because in labeling people as hipsters for not conforming to a 
certain set of expected behaviors or appearances, while also accusing those same people of being 
conformists to hipsterdom, non-conformist behaviors are uniformly dismissed as trivial.  Thus, 
whatever cultural critiques those non-conformist behaviors may have communicated are largely 
ignored. 
 It feels like a perfect night / to dress up like hipsters sings ultra-bland country-gone-pop 
star Taylor Swift in “22.”  Meanwhile the song’s accompanying music video looks like a 
commercial for Urban Outfitters, the clothing retailer perhaps most shameless in its 
appropriation of fashion from all walks of alt life for the mass millennial market.  With this 
lyric/video combination Swift gets to claim distance from and distain for hipsterdom while also 
enjoying the faux-rebellious “hipster” aesthetic which is in fact current mainstream fashion.  She 
is being ironic about being ironic, and smug about disliking smugness.  This place is too crowded 
/ Too many cool kids she complains over a sound bite of someone sneering “Who’s Taylor Swift 
anyway? Ew!”  The sound bite is obviously ironic; Swift is mega-famous, has sold over 25 
million albums, makes around 50 million dollars a year.
9
  Swift’s solution to the supposedly 
suffocating over-presence of fans of all that weird obscure music is to suggest that We ditch the 
whole scene, implying that she is undoubtedly “cool” enough to have been privy to underground 
music communities and knows well enough from experience that it is better to wash one’s hands 
of them entirely before turning on the radio.  In another single she maligns an ex-boyfriend for 
his hipster tendencies in situations of relationship strife: you would hide away and find your 
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peace of mind / with some indie record that's much cooler than mine.
10
  Of course 
institutionalized rebellion is contradictory.  By defining cool as that which subverts the 
mainstream, the mainstream is then deeply self-conscious about its own resulting implicit 
uncoolness.  Swift deals with this discomfort by dissing what’s critical or rebellious for being 
smugly superior, simultaneously soothing the self-consciousness her actual fans may feel about 
enjoying her music by absurdly congratulating them for not giving in to some imagined peer 
pressure to like what’s unpopular. 
This type of convoluted and essentially empty message is not at all uncommon right now.  
Swift’s particular style of hate for her haters’ hate is an example of a practice that Tom Scocca 
identifies as “smarm,” a strategy of deflecting negative criticism by dismissing it as “snark” with 
an appeal to the half-baked notion that negativity itself is inherently bad, that destructiveness is 
always abhorrent no matter what one is trying to destroy, and that those who criticize are 
immoral in their very assumption of their own authority to criticize anything on a moral basis.  
Never mind that smarm itself is a negative criticism based on its own pretension as moral arbiter 
of what is or is not a proper style of expression.  From the position of smarm, snark is “the 
problem of our times,” and Scocca notes a “troublesome misreading” in which “snark is often 
conflated with cynicism” when in fact “the practice of cynicism is smarm.” 
In Scocca’s words smarm is “a kind of performance—an assumption about the forms of 
seriousness, of virtue, of constructiveness, without the substance.”  A performance?  That 
appropriates morally-inspired practices without subscribing to the values behind them?  That 
lacks substance?  If Scocca’s description brings to mind a certain archetype of youth culture, 
consider that many of his examples of smarmers-in-action are US politicians, a group immune to 
the hipster label.  Scocca argues that although politicians and mass media both bemoan the “tone” 
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of politics as overly nasty and negative, this concern over tone is created by “a thick flow of 
opaque smarm” that is actually “what carries contemporary American political campaigns along.”  
“To openly disagree with a political foe, let alone to make an openly mean remark, is to invite a 
smarmy counterattack” that accuses “name-calling” or a “personal attack” in order to avoid 
addressing the criticism.  Americans have a lot to be angry about—bank bailouts, NSA spying 
and data collection, unemployment and economic disparity, destruction of the environment, and 
the military-industrial complex to name a few things—but for some reason it is unthinkable that 
a viable candidate for public office would or should actually demonstrate the level of anger on 
our behalf that the national situation calls for.  Of course this is not actually because the 
impropriety of such a candidate would be somehow more damaging to the US than its current 
situation, but because all the viable candidates are viable due to the positions of power they 
already occupy and their investment in maintaining a certain dynamics of power, no matter how 
much smarm is required. 
 What distinguishes the hipster’s shield of irony from the politician’s smarm is that while 
the former has no esteem for seriousness, taking an attitude that Wallace characterizes as saying 
“How very banal to ask what I mean” (184), the latter deflects criticism by pretending to be 
more mature, more serious, as if to say “How very rude to reveal what I do.”  In its insistence 
that if one can’t say anything nice then one shouldn’t say anything at all, smarm neutralizes 
plain-spoken critique of hypocrisy with more hypocrisy to the same extent that irony neutralizes 
ironic critiques with more irony. 
 Claire Colebrook argues that “our very historical context is ironic because today nothing 
really means what it says,” adding that this “general and all-encompassing irony” is “at one with 
the problem of politics: how do we know what others really mean, and on what basis can we 
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secure the sincerity” of any message when “we live in a world of quotation, pastiche, and 
simulation?” (1-2)?  Mass media and advertising intercept, distort, and complicate 
communication, making it difficult to talk back, or even talk to each other.  American society has 
become saturated with advertising, which “as a discourse that reads itself and tries to anticipate 
and direct its own reception...is never innocent” (“David Foster Wallace” 138).  Trained to do the 
same on an individual level—as evinced by social media behavior and the appearance of the 
term “personal brand”—it is understandable that many Americans might be cynical.  If someone 
does want to express something deeply felt, widespread cynicism and detachment in the audience 
presents some intimidating obstacles.  A writer cannot just say what she means, but must also 
convince readers that she really means it, and that they should take her seriously.  In the current 
cultural context, that is not a simple task. 
* 
 In Sincerity and Authenticity, Lionel Trilling defines the quality of sincerity in the 
simplest terms as “a congruence between avowal and actual feeling” (2).  According to Trilling, 
the concept of sincerity as it is now commonly understood has not always existed, and its 
meaning has changed over time along with Western thought and social structures.  He points to 
differences between attitudes of modern literature and those of its ancestors to demonstrate its 
historical context: 
We cannot say of the patriarch Abraham that he was a sincere man.  That 
statement must seem only comical.  The sincerity of Achilles or Beowulf cannot 
be discussed: they neither have nor lack sincerity.  But if we ask whether young 
Werther is really as sincere as he intends to be, or which of the two Dashwood 
sisters, Elinor or Marianne, is thought by Jane Austen to be the more truly sincere, 
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we can confidently expect a serious response in the form of opinions on both sides 
of the question. (2-3) 
 Trilling notes an “obvious connection between sincerity and the intensified sense of 
personal identity that developed along with the growth of the idea of society” (47) in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.  While both a community and a society can be 
described as “an aggregate of individual human beings,” the former implies a stronger sense of 
personal relationships within that aggregate that do not define the latter.  Trilling notes that 
“society is yet something other than this, something other than human, and its being conceived in 
this way, as having indeed a life of its own but not a human life, gives rise to the human desire to 
bring it into accord with humanity” (19).  Groups like the Calvinist divines “regarded society as 
fallen into corruption through false avowal” and aimed to combat this with passionate 
proclamations of what they believed to be the Word of God.  Thus, in their time and context, 
“plain speaking became the order of the day” (21), and the concept of sincerity emerged to 
describe this mode of communication. 
 Sincerity therefore has a history of association with virtuousness.  Trilling points to 
Hamlet's treatment of the topic of sincerity to illustrate a nuance necessary to understanding the 
concept.  He focuses on the scene in which Polonius famously entreats Laertes to remember 
“This above all: to thine own self be true/And it doth follow, as the night the day,/Thou canst not 
then be false to any man” (1.3.80-82).  Trilling calls this “a moment of self-transcendence, of 
grace and truth” in which Polonius “has conceived of sincerity as an essential condition of virtue 
and has discovered how it is to be attained” (3).  Polonius' statement presents sincerity as a type 
of relationship one should have with one's self, for the purpose of having a moral relationship to 
others.   
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 But there is a tension in the simultaneous acceptance of concepts of individuality and 
society that makes the seemingly simple aim to be true to one's self and honest with others 
difficult to navigate.  Trilling explains that the individual in society “is subject to the constant 
influence, the literal inflowing, of the mental processes of others, which, in the degree that they 
stimulate or enlarge his consciousness, make it less his own.  He finds it ever more difficult to 
know what his own self is and what being true to it consists in” (61).  Perhaps these questions of 
the nature of the self became especially confusing with the advent of modern society because it 
caused people to realize how mutable they are in response to others around them.  Living in a 
largely populated area might mean that one belongs to several different social groups without 
much overlap.  One might act differently in each group—at work, at home, at church, at school, 
and so on—and thus might have trouble deciding which “self” is the authentic one. 
 On the one hand, Europeans came to conceive of themselves as individuals with unique 
selves to be true to.  On the other hand, these supposed individuals became subject to the 
homogenizing force of public opinion.  This conflict may be a reason why the concept of 
sincerity already came to seem antiquated or naive in the late 20
th
 century.  Trilling argues that 
the purpose of “avoidance of falsehood to others...does not figure as the defining purpose of 
being true to one's own self” in current common moral thinking, which he characterizes as ever-
changing throughout the history of Western society.  He differentiates “the unmediated exhibition 
of the self, presumably with the intention of being true to it” from “an effort of sincerity,” 
proposing that “if sincerity has lost its former status, if the word itself has for us a hollow sound 
that seems almost to negate its meaning, that is because it does not propose being true to one’s 
own self as an end but only as a means” (9) to self-indulgence. 
 As poet and self-proclaimed “New Sincerist” Anthony Robinson notes in a 2005 blog 
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post that “The New Sincerity has built-in irony. There’s nothing 'new' about sincerity.”  What is 
new, however, is what sincerity looks like.  William Wordsworth's poetry sounds sincere to the 
modern reader, but it also sounds its age, which is over 200 years old.  Take the opening stanza 
of perhaps his most famous work: 
  I wandered lonely as a cloud 
  That floats on high o’er vales and hills, 
  When all at once I saw a crowd, 
  A host, of golden daffodils; 
  Beside the lake, beneath the trees, 
  Fluttering and dancing in the breeze. 
 “I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud” seems like a genuine expression of appreciation for the 
beauty of nature, and that appears to be its singular purpose.  One important factor in its 
effectiveness as a communication is that the reader believes that Wordsworth really means it 
when he says that his “heart with pleasure fills / And dances with the daffodils.”  And while his 
sincerity is still touching today, it also sounds quaint to the modern reader, perhaps even naïve.  
Today's poets typically do not want to sound like Wordsworth, and any that do would risk 
sounding more fake than sincere.  It would most likely seem like they were just putting on a 
stereotypically poet-like tone, either in an ironic sense or from simple lack of creativity.  Today's 
writers therefore have a puzzle to work out if they want to communicate something deeply felt.  
An attempt to be straightforward may fail to come off as intended, especially because Americans 
are trained to suspect selfish motivations from others.  A side effect of this training, along with 
advertising’s constant appropriation of art, is a change in the very way one thinks of art and 
artists.  Klein notes a tendency for some contemporary artists to act as “a walking sales pitch for 
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themselves already, intuitively understanding how to produce prepackaged art, to be their own 
brand” (294)—and even in cases where they do not, the audience may still come to their art 
expecting that it was made with an eye primarily toward social recognition and economic gain. 
* 
 There has evidently emerged a cultural situation in which it is often very difficult to talk 
about problems in a way that effects change, and to create art that successfully fulfills a purpose 
beyond that of a marketable commodity.  As a fiction writer, Wallace observed U.S. fiction 
meeting the same frustrations as culture jammers in attempts to enact critique.  The work of 
young writers attempting “to transfigure a world of and for appearance, mass appeal, and 
television” in Wallace’s time comprise a genre which he calls “the fiction of image” (or “image-
fiction”).  This genre, he says, fails in its attempt “almost without exception” (173).  He points to 
a tendency to “render their material with the same tone of irony and self-consciousness that their 
ancestors, the literary insurgents of Beat and postmodernism, used so effectively to rebel against 
their own world and context” (173) as the source of the imagists’ failure.  Because televisual 
entertainment has come to render its own material in the same way, “image-fiction doesn't satisfy 
its own agenda.  Instead, it most often degenerates into a kind of jeering, surfacy look 'behind the 
scenes' of the very televisual front people already jeer at, and can already get behind the scenes 
of” (173) via TV programs about TV, or shows that parody TV tropes.  In its attempt to apply 
techniques of literary realism to a world now permeated by fictitious and ironic images and 
messages, image-fiction falls into the trap of author and reader self-congratulation for spotting 
hypocrisy, a trap that TV depends on to remain compelling.  Wallace uses Don DeLillo's White 
Noise as an example.  White Noise is in many ways a brilliant novel and Wallace seems to think 
so as well.  Nevertheless he points out that “the authorial tone throughout is a kind of deadpan 
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sneer.  Jack [the narrator] himself is utterly mute - since to speak out loud in the scene would 
render the narrator part of the farce (instead of a detached, transcendent 'observer and recorder') 
and so vulnerable to ridicule himself. With his silence, DeLillo's alter ego Jack eloquently 
diagnoses the very disease from which he, Murray, barn-watchers, and readers all suffer” (171), 
but leaves the reader with no real suggestion of how to respond effectively to all the “white noise” 
of consumerism, mass media, pop culture and so on.  The reader can feel shame for his or her 
complicity in the absurd state of affairs that DeLillo diagnoses, or more appealingly and likely, 
can entertain the self-satisfaction of understanding DeLillo's irony and thus feel a transcendent 
superiority.   
 This effect is ultimately unsatisfying, because it does nothing to dismantle the actual 
situation that White Noise critiques.  Image-fiction’s ironic critique of televisual culture is 
neutralized in its context, because in ironically critiquing something that is essentially ironic it 
remains trapped inside the conceptual framework that it opposes.  But one can see why young 
writers would find ironic detachment a necessary element in their writing.  To ignore the 
presence of the device in American speech and attitudes in Wallace’s time would mean writing in 
a way that sounds outdated and unrelatable to young readers raised on TV. 
Wallace’s awareness of the problems of television and U.S. fiction informs his own 
artistic project, which could be seen as an attempt to grapple with problems of clear 
communication and effective critique created by ironic culture.  At the end of his essay, he posits 
that perhaps there is still a way for fiction to effect change, if only the right approach is found.  
Though Wallace never uses the words “New Sincerity” here, this passage has come to be taken 
as a sort of prediction of the so-named movement, and Wallace’s work is now often associated 
with the term.   
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The next real literary 'rebels' in this country might well emerge as some weird 
bunch of 'anti-rebels,' born oglers who dare to back away from ironic watching, 
who have the childish gall actually to endorse single-entendre values.  Who treat 
old untrendy human troubles and emotions in U.S.  life with reverence and 
conviction.  Who eschew self- consciousness and fatigue.  These anti-rebels 
would be outdated, of course, before they even started.  Too sincere.  Clearly 
repressed.  Backward, quaint, naive, anachronistic.  Maybe that'll be the point, 
why they'll be the next real rebels.  Real rebels, as far as I can see, risk things.  
Risk disapproval.  The old postmodern insurgents risked the gasp and squeal: 
shock, disgust, outrage, censorship, accusations of socialism, anarchism, nihilism.  
The new rebels might be the ones willing to risk the yawn, the rolled eyes, the 
cool smile, the nudged ribs, the parody of gifted ironists, the 'How banal.' 
Accusations of sentimentality, melodrama.  Credulity.  Willingness to be suckered 
by a world of lurkers and starers who fear gaze and ridicule above imprisonment 
without law.  Who knows.  Today's most engaged young fiction does seem like 
some kind of line's end's end.  I guess that means we all get to draw our own 
conclusions.  Have to. (192-193) 
II 
To discover how New Sincerity might achieve effective methods of expression for the 
current cultural situation, it is necessary to consider the extent to which formal qualities 
determine an artwork's effect on its audience.  Since I am particularly interested in New Sincerity 
in fiction, my investigation will focus on narrative forms. 
The formal qualities that distinguish different genres of narrative are not simply the result 
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of arbitrary stylistic preference.  A narrative is a communication, and as such the form a narrative 
takes reveals deeply held beliefs about how to communicate effectively, as well as what should 
be communicated or what even is communicable.  Comparison between contemporary forms and 
those they have eclipsed therefore provides clues as to how a culture has changed over time in 
terms of its members' habits of interaction and their shared assumptions about reality. 
The process of modernization in Western society coincided with a shift from a 
predominately oral tradition to a practice of written narrative.  In “The Storyteller,” Walter 
Benjamin compares these two modes of communication in an effort to describe the cultural 
change that accompanied modernization.  With the simple observation that “what distinguishes 
the novel from the story” of pre-modern oral tradition “is its essential dependence on the book” 
(87), Benjamin directs attention to a revealing difference between the two narrative modes' ways 
of fitting into everyday life.  The novel typically exists as a multiplicity of virtually identical 
physical objects—a variety of incidences in space—while the existence of a story does not 
depend upon its being written down, but rather its being passed on through oral tradition as a 
variety of incidences across time.  A story is not necessarily confined to an exact wording nor 
even a particular tone or speaker, and so may be adapted to suit a unique context each time it is 
told.  Its physicality only depends on there being a person to tell the story, another to listen to it, 
and a space within which that activity can take place.  The novel is less readily adaptable to 
changing circumstances.  Time may eventually destroy a book, either through physical 
degradation and lack of reproduction or because of change in cultural context, language and 
attitudes that can make its static and finite narrative outdated or even incomprehensible. 
In an oral tradition, history and other cultural narratives must necessarily be located in the 
consciousness of a community's members in order to persist.  One utility of a written record is 
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that it can be stored so that if its content is forgotten there is still an opportunity, as long as the 
physical record is maintained, of the content being found and remembered once more.  As a side 
effect, this utility allows for history and other cultural narratives to be put out of mind in 
everyday life, and exposure to them becomes more subject to individual interest and reading 
ability and less an inherent aspect of membership in a culture.  The accumulation of various 
writings over time in a society with effective preservation methods also creates incongruity as to 
which works individual members are familiar with as the number of writings preserved becomes 
more than any one person could realistically read.  In contrast, the volume of storytelling 
material that persists over time in a community's oral tradition is naturally limited and filtered by 
the priorities and capacities of storytellers and the reaction of their audience.  Stories that either 
party does not find important or interesting are simply not re-told, if they are ever told at all, and 
a storyteller can organically condense the most salient points of a great volume of cultural history 
that would take much longer to read all the written records of. 
Benjamin associates the adoption of printing technology and a concomitant proliferation 
of written works with the rise of information as a “new form of communication” (88).  Always 
expressible in straightforward written language, information distinguishes itself from other 
sources of knowledge in that it “lays claim to prompt verifiability” (89), presenting itself as 
proven true by reference to empirical data.  As information becomes the most ubiquitous and 
privileged form of communication in modernized society, objectivity becomes the dominant 
epistemological standard.  Within this cultural mindset, every event is “shot through with 
explanation” (89), a phenomenon that stems from the increasingly pervasive assumption that not 
only is everything explainable given enough of the right empirical data, but that there is only one 
true explanation for anything and that such knowledge can only be legitimately obtained through 
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objectivity.  Benjamin says that “now almost nothing that happens benefits storytelling,” a 
practice in which “the psychological connection of the events is not forced upon the reader” (89) 
and one is free to interpret meaning as one finds appropriate.  Instead in modernity “almost 
everything benefits information” (89).  To view information as the only true source of knowledge 
is to believe that knowledge only comprises that which can be reduced to sentences in plain 
written language.  This misconception results in narrowed access to other modes of perception in 
its dismissal of ineffable experiences as a source of knowledge. 
The rigidity of wording in the form of the novel is reflective of an approach to reality that 
takes a similarly rigid view of truth.  Issues of translation aside, a copy of Pride and Prejudice is 
only considered “really” Pride and Prejudice if it appears in the exact wording that corresponds 
to a particular standard of what the “true” wording of Pride and Prejudice is.  But although 
information that “confronts storytelling” (88) as communication and the proliferation of the form 
of the novel both arise with the same modern technology, Benjamin observes that the rise of 
information also “brings about a crisis in the novel” (88).  If there really was only one objective 
truth to anything, then that reasoning indicates that there is only a single truth as to what any 
particular novel is attempting to communicate to its reader.  Of course even if that were so, one 
would be hard-pressed to verify as a piece of information which interpretation of a novel is the 
“correct” one.  Even if this singular meaning could be somehow verified, the meaning would 
then need to be weighed itself as either truth or falsehood, a project that itself most likely could 
not be made subject to an objective standard.  The novel, as well as the story, will then always be 
thought an inadequate mode of communication in a society that privileges information for being 
“'understandable in itself'” (89). 
The only thing that a novel might then attempt to pass off as information, and thus valid 
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knowledge, is communication of an individual's experience.  That individual experience is 
specifically that of the author, because she only has access to her own.  No matter how 
masterfully written a novel is, however, it can never communicate any individual experience 
fully, because it is the nature of individual experience to not be fully communicable.  
Incommunicability makes an experience individual.  Because a society with an information-
centric epistemology does not conceive of ineffable knowledge as legitimate knowledge, a given 
individual in that society may not even give her own experiences much weight in forming her 
understanding of reality, which could lead to a lack of self-understanding.  Without self-
understanding it is even harder to empathize with others' experiences which are already not fully 
communicable.  Benjamin thus describes the novelist as “isolated,” in contrast to the storyteller, 
who “takes what he tells from experience—his own or that reported by others” and “makes it the 
experience of those who are listening to his tale” (87). 
Given this distinction, it seems that Benjamin holds the story in much higher esteem than 
the novel, attributing to the former “the ability to exchange experiences” that he describes as 
fundamental to human life and social connection while criticizing the latter as essentially useless 
for that purpose despite its best efforts.  The very experience of reading a novel is characterized 
by the isolation of a reader with a book.  This reader of a novel will in most cases never meet the 
author and cannot ask questions of this individual who is considered the sole authority on 
interpretation of the narrative.  The storyteller, however, is in the presence of the story's audience.  
The telling of the story is an interaction, a shared experience in itself.  A listener may ask a 
question of the storyteller and thus participate in creation of a new part of a story that would not 
have ever been uttered had the question not been asked.  Storytelling also gives rise to “counsel” 
among those engaged in the activity, because to Benjamin “every real story...contains, openly or 
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covertly, something useful.” For the listener that usefulness might come in the form of “a moral,” 
“some practical advice”, or “a proverb or maxim” (86).  The acting storyteller could also receive 
counsel for a personal and current story, a counsel which Benjamin describes as “less an answer 
to a question than a proposal concerning the continuation of a story which is just unfolding” (86).  
The interaction of “counsel” is a very basic form of human care and connection.  Considering 
that, it becomes clear that the change that Benjamin sees in the predominant narrative aesthetic is 
nothing less than a fundamental shift in the way humans in the Western social context interact 
with one another and perceive reality. 
It is significant that the novels that manage to survive in a society's consciousness for 
many generations achieve this preservation mainly through formal literary education.  In such 
education a group of students read a work together and a teacher helps them interpret that work 
and gain non-informational knowledge from it through discussion.  In its facilitation of shared 
experience this type of interaction is perhaps not unlike the interaction of listeners with the 
storyteller that Benjamin describes.  Because Western society privileges information, however, 
there is now a common confusion about why literary education is important and what is to be 
gained from it.  From an information-centric perspective, literary studies appear to be about 
pointlessly memorizing “what happened” in works of fiction.  Students who choose to pursue an 
education specializing in literature or other arts often confront attitudes that their studies are 
frivolous or useless, a widespread mindset that is apparent in a current trend in public education 
towards de-funding studies of the humanities.  A general disconnect with sources of knowledge 
outside of empirical observation results in a distortion of priorities.  If study of the human 
experience of being in the world is no longer given importance, there is nothing to inform 
everyday choices with an eye toward spiritual wellness. 
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In The Theory of the Novel György Lukács says that “the novel is the epic of a world that 
has been abandoned by God” (88).  He equates the epic form with youthfulness because its 
heroes are “guided by the gods: whether what awaits them at the end of the road are the embers 
of annihilation or the joys of success, or both at once, they never walk alone, they are always led” 
(86).  Meanwhile to Lukács the novel demonstrates 
the melancholy of the adult state [that] arises from our dual, conflicting 
experience that, on the one hand, our absolute, youthful confidence in an inner 
voice has diminished or died, and, on the other hand, that the outside world to 
which we now devote ourselves in our desire to learn its ways and dominate it 
will never speak to us in a voice that will clearly tell us our way and determine 
our goal. (86) 
What does it mean to feel spoken to by God, to feel like the purpose of one's existence is 
immanent?  In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Émile Durkheim notes that feelings of 
religious ecstasy have been observed in worshipers of all cultures regardless of the particularities 
of their practices.  He therefore argues that the feeling of religious experience must come from a 
source different than whatever specific thing the worshiper believes it to be, and that that source 
is society itself.  According to Durkheim, society’s influence is felt “only if it is in action,” which 
only occurs when “the individuals who compose it are assembled and act in common,” as in 
religious ritual.  Such ritual nurtures in the worshiper the feelings of belonging and safety that 
come from participation in a group and “raises him above himself” by making the worshiper feel 
part of some force bigger than one can be as an individual.  Durkheim concludes that because 
religion sets up the framework for life and conceptualizing the world, and because the source of 
religion is society, “it is society that makes [the worshiper]” (313) by determining thought and 
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action.  If cohesive social experience is religious experience, religious experiences are not 
inherently tied to explicitly religious institutions, but more generally to instances of human 
communion. 
The meaning of life feels apparent to humans experiencing that oceanic feeling of 
connection with existence that is religious ecstasy.  A society that believes that the only 
legitimate knowledge is that which can be expressed as information is at odds with 
understanding why an ineffable experience is still valuable, indeed essential to human well-being.  
But existence is ineffable.  No matter how much empirical data one might collect to describe the 
functioning of the universe, its being will on a deep level always be inexplicable in terms of 
information.  To disregard this wholly self-evident but ineffable experience because it is not 
congruent with an epistemology that insists on explaining everything in words is to rob oneself 
of the fundamental, spiritual experience of being a part of the universe. 
According to Lukács, “when the structures made by man for man are really adequate to 
man, they are his necessary and native home; and he does not know the nostalgia that poses and 
experiences nature as the object of its own seeking and finding” (64).  To a being who feels itself 
a part of existence at core, comprehending an inherent and inextricable connection to everything 
there is, it would seem absurd to ask “what is the meaning of life?”  This question is a symptom 
of the “transcendental homelessness” (41) that Lukács describes, a feeling of unrootedness that 
arises when humans conceptualize themselves as wholly separate from nature.  To ask the 
question “What is the meaning of life?” is to assume that this request for knowledge might 
potentially be fulfilled as would a question like “what is for lunch today?” or “what is twelve 
times nine?”  The folly in this thinking is failure to realize that the meaning of life may well not 
be communicable through information.  It is not a fact that could be looked up somewhere and 
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verified according to any empirical data, but perhaps an experience, namely that of connecting 
with other conscious beings through shared experience, of finding a way to not be isolated and to 
feel oneself as part of existence. 
Benjamin urges his reader to see that Erfahrung—shared, communicable experience, 
which he differentiates from individual experience—“has fallen in value” (83-84) in Western 
culture.  Seeing that Erfahrung is exactly what produces a sense of profound meaning and 
connection, it is no wonder that “the meaning of life is really the center about which the novel 
moves” (99).  Lukács highlights this fundamental aspect of the form by contrasting the 
protagonist of the novel with the pre-modern epic hero.  The latter, for example Odysseus, feels a 
sense of divine guidance and “is, strictly speaking, never an individual.  It is traditionally thought 
that one of the essential characteristics of the epic is the fact that its theme is not a personal 
destiny but the destiny of a community...The autonomous life of interiority is possible and 
necessary only when the distinctions between men have made an unbridgeable chasm.”  This 
chasm is created by the modern humans' conception of themselves as individuals as does “the 
hero of the novel [who] is the product of estrangement from the outside world” (66).  Trilling 
likewise asserts that the idea of the individual only emerged in Western thought “at a certain 
point in history” (24).  He observes that the current conception of the individual is now so 
embedded that it can be hard to imagine what alternative form of self-perception existed prior to 
the current model: 
Taken in isolation, the statement is absurd.  How was a man different from an 
individual? A person born before a certain date, a man—had he not eyes? Had he 
not hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? If you pricked him, he 
bled and if you tickled him, he laughed.  But certain things he did not have or do 
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until he became an individual.  He did not have an awareness of what one 
historian, Georges Gusdorf, calls internal space.  He did not, as Delany puts it, 
imagine himself in more than one role, standing outside or above his own 
personality; he did not suppose that he might be an object of interest to his fellow 
man not for the reason that he had achieved something notable or been witness to 
great events but simply because as an individual he was of consequence. (24) 
Here Benjamin's apparent preference for the story over the novel as a communication 
seems suspect.  How could a time before a conception of the individual with a claim to inner 
subjectivity and inalienable rights be truly better, more socially cohesive and spiritually fulfilling?  
These modern concepts have given way to struggles against evils like slavery and sexism, 
elements of the hegemonic culture that New Sincerity—at least in its most noble potential 
application—would aim to challenge.  Benjamin's apparent nostalgia seems naïve and hard to 
justify.  Note, however, that Benjamin describes the storyteller as only taking shape in cultural 
imagination now that storytelling is not a part of our everyday experience, visible from a distance 
“prescribed for us by an experience which we may have almost every day” (83) in life is no 
longer characterized by this type of shared interaction with others.  Describing a current 
archetype of the past regardless of that archetype's historical accuracy is useful, because it 
potentially reveals something about modern experience and desires.  The nostalgia surrounding 
the idea of the storyteller points to what aspects of modern life are felt to be absurd or 
dissatisfying, and what of the situation is perhaps not inherently inevitable or unchangeable.  
Trilling writes that the social effects of rapid population growth associated with urbanization 
entail “a condition of life that literature has chiefly deplored.”  As a result, 
for many generations the educated bourgeoisie has characteristically shuddered 
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away from the moral and spiritual effects of the circumstance from which it 
derives its being and its name.  Its vision of the good life, so far as it has been 
enlightened and polemical, has been largely shaped by the imagination of the old 
rural existence. (20) 
The existence of this idyllic archetype of the past in the modern mindset is a 
manifestation of what appears in the novel as “the nostalgia of the characters for utopian 
perfection, a nostalgia that feels itself and its desires to be the only true reality” (Lukács 70).  
Only after modernization did isolation become such a common thematic topic in Western art, for 
“it is when he becomes an individual that a man lives more and more in private rooms; whether 
the privacy makes the individuality or the individuality requires the privacy the historians do not 
say” (Trilling 24-25).  Recognition of this dissatisfaction does not require a dismissal of valuable 
aspects of reforms that came out of ideas of classical liberalism in the West, nor does it 
necessarily express a longing to return to feudalism. 
Lukács is perhaps misguided in connecting the novel to maturity and thus implying that 
there is a straightforward sort of intellectual progress to be seen in its rise to the position of 
privileged narrative form.  New problems, such as the issue of widespread social isolation, have 
resulted from the changes that dominant Western thought often characterizes as part of a destiny 
of purely desirable, linear improvements to humans' understanding and lifestyle.
11
  To 
conceptualize history in terms of constant progress implies incorrectly that there is no legitimate 
knowledge that pre-modern people were more aware of than people today.  Humans only have so 
much attention to give anything in a day, and where attention is directed molds perception.  
                                                 
11
As if it were some sort of perceptual holdover, the Western myth of constant progress parallels the trajectory of the 
epic.  The former anticipates a similar trajectory towards a glorious and victorious fate for its people under the 
direction of a more powerful force.  The former is guided by science, the latter by religious belief; these two 
guides perhaps play more similar roles for their followers than typically thought. 
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Certain modern conveniences allow one to get by without paying attention to aspects of the 
world that people before these conveniences could not afford to ignore.  One such aspect is death.  
Before industrialization no one was far from reminders of death, for people commonly died in 
the same rooms they lived in.  With modernization it became routine for people to die in 
hospitals, privately and according to routine procedure, their corpses dealt with by professionals 
rather than family.  Surely the illusion that the fundamental truth of death is far away has an 
effect on one's perspective on life. 
It follows that different kinds of knowledge are nurtured by different ways of life and the 
mindsets associated with their common activities.  With the rise of modernity and capitalism, the 
dominant mode of production changed from self-directed artisan craftsmanship to industrial 
factory work in which the laborer makes a product as efficiently as possible according to the 
orders of whoever owns the means of production.  Benjamin suggests that the storyteller is like a 
craftsman for whom it is “his very task to fashion the raw material of experience, his own and 
that of others, in a solid, useful, unique way” (108), and that as “the role of the hand in 
production has become more modest...the place it filled in storytelling lies waste” (108).  
Benjamin also describes a particular mental state that is necessary in order for a listener to retain 
a story in order to retell it later.  This “gift for listening” is activated as a listener engages in 
“activities that are intimately associated with boredom” such as monotonous artisan tasks like 
“weaving and spinning.”  These mindless, repetitive occupations make one “self-forgetful” and 
therefore more open to assimilating the experience of a story as one's own.  With the 
disappearance of the artisan production, “the gift for listening is lost and the community of 
listeners disappears” (91).  What Benjamin does not address is that boredom certainly still exists 
in everyday life in capitalist society—many if not most jobs are repetitive and unengaging, the 
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commutes to and from those jobs are often long and tedious, and so on.  But now there are all 
kinds of chatter to fill that space of boredom.  In most commercial spaces there is music or radio 
playing and often televisions playing, there is radio in the car, there are billboards to look at, 
there are even ads on the back of the bathroom stall door.  There is now a proliferation of 
messages to absorb in boredom, but these messages tend to have a particular commercial motive.  
And they are often there whether one chooses them or not, crowding out self-directed activities 
that people might otherwise be more motivated to discover. 
The implication of Benjamin's assertion is that the switch to capitalism results in 
widespread social isolation.  If a change in the mode of production facilitates the loss of the 
ability to listen to one another and share experiences, then there is no cohesive community, only 
individuals searching for meaning within their own experience and vulnerable to external 
messages about reality not informed by human need.  If a change from oral to written narrative 
signals such a shift in human social life, or perhaps even serves as a driving force for that shift, 
there arises the question of the value of literacy.  Surely it is not ultimately detrimental.  It is 
entirely possible that I am just too attached to literature as a personal source of meaning and 
connection to consider life without it, but in any case, those who live in the aftermath of 
modernization do not have the option of simply undoing the resulting systems in one motion.  
Already being literate and dependent on the myriad benefits of literacy, it seems more promising 
to search for methods by which written narrative can communicate something more meaningful 
than the narrow, isolating perceptions of reality that characterize the traditional novel.   
Understanding the significance of the novel as dominant narrative form and the history of 
interplay between literacy and human relationships in the West are valuable to the project of New 
Sincerity.  Such a movement is concerned with effective communication from author and 
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audience, and necessarily must search for a way to subvert corporate media's hold on 
interpersonal and artistic communication.  New Sincerity therefore must open the reader to 
alternative modes of perception.  It must also strive to facilitate Erfahrung, if not through the 
experience of art itself then in the image of life it encourages the reader to live. 
III 
Wallace seems to imply in “E Unibus Pluram” that he thinks himself not creative enough 
to be a member of this next group of “literary rebels,” that he is personally out of ideas as to how 
to tackle the artistic problem he describes.  Perhaps he is just too self-conscious to fully own his 
display of sentimentality and idealism in his essay, because in any case there remains the fact 
that he went on to write Infinite Jest.  Significantly, this work of fiction deals in depth with 
thematic topics of irony, sincerity, and communication, as well as American televisual and 
political culture, literary theory, and virtually every concern he touches on in “E Unibus Pluram.”  
The phrase “E Unibus Pluram” as well as several other phrases from the essay even appear 
verbatim in the novel.   
Infinite Jest is indeed presented as a novel.  Wallace refers to it as such in at least one 
interview in 1996, the year it was first published.
12
  The back cover of the most recent printing of 
Infinite Jest describes the work as “one of those rare books that renew the idea of what a novel 
can do.”13 Such renewal is characteristic of New Sincerity's search to discover more effective 
methods of communication through art.  The book is huge at over a thousand pages long, and has 
a unique and experimental narrative style that will perhaps provide insight into what an attempt 
at New Sincerity looks like in practice. 
In the aforementioned interview, Wallace agrees with host Michael Silverblatt's 
                                                 
12
 “David Foster Wallace,” KCRW. 
13
 It seems safe to assume that Wallace himself did not write the back-cover blurb, and unknown as to whether he 
actually wanted it there or not. 
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observation that the structure of Infinite Jest displays fractal-like patterns.  Silverblatt explains 
that 
the way in which the material is presented allows for a subject to be announced in 
a small form, then there seems to be a fan of subject matter, other subjects, then 
[the first subject] comes back in a second form containing the other subjects in 
small [instances], and then comes back again as if what were being described 
were...fractals. 
 Wallace reveals that because he is “trying to a do a whole bunch of different things at 
once” in Infinite Jest, he chose to model its narrative structure after a Sierpinski gasket, also 
called a Sierpinski triangle (see fig. 1) in order to remain organized while working with such a 
large volume of writing.  David Hering gives one analysis of how the novel maps to this 
particular fractal design, keeping in mind that the structure was not perfectly retained in the 
editing process: 
The process of constructing a Sierpinski gasket can potentially go on 
indefinitely...Infinite Jest follows broadly a pattern of 28 chapters, containing 
subchapters, which gradually grow in size, and are chronologically non-linear.  
The novel begins with 15 chapters in 179 pages and climaxes with just 1 chapter 
in 173  pages.  This begins to illustrate the triangular “fractal”...[There is] an 
increase in the size and focus of the chapters...and the initial smaller chapters—
relatable to the smaller triangles of the gasket shape—are later retrospectively 
understood to form part of the overarching structure so we are ultimately aware of 
the gargantuan system of relationships that operates across the entire novel. (89-90) 
 Wallace tells Silverblatt that he does not feel it important that the reader think of actual 
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fractals while reading.  The style simply emerged out of his need to follow what “tastes true” to 
him, and in his view it seemed an intuitively appropriate approach to representing modern 
experience given that 
so much of pre-millenial life in America consists of enormous amounts of what 
seem like discreet bits of information coming, and that the real kind of intellectual 
adventure is finding ways to relate them to each other and to find larger patterns 
and meanings, which of course is essentially narrative. 
 Wallace emphasizes that he does not intend to “impose” a complex narrative structure on 
the reader with Infinite Jest, and in fact felt very concerned during the writing process that the 
novel would come off as “gratuitously long or gratuitously hard.”  Silverblatt expresses a 
“tenderness” toward Infinite Jest, noting that part of his reading experience included a perception 
of an “extraordinary effort that was going into writing it,” an effort that amounted not to 
“difficulty for difficulty's sake” but an “immense difficulty being expended because something 
important about how difficult it has become to be human needed to be said, and that there weren't 
other ways to say that.”  Silverblatt's reading experience describes my own very accurately, and 
seems to fit well with the reaction of Infinite Jest fans that I have spoken with.  Those who like it 
tend to really like it, and they often share Silverblatt's sense of tenderness; my brother once 
described the book to me as “very sweet.”14  Which is not to say that everyone feels that way, 
and there are definitely readers who are put off by Wallace's prose style.  The risk of being 
perceived as somehow show-off-ish or pointlessly unorthodox is perhaps inherent in pursuing 
New Sincerity projects, since they are necessarily experimental.  Recalling Wallace's project as 
an attempt to succeed where he saw image-fiction failing to “transfigure a world of and for,” 
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 I understand that some people hear it as a condescending put-down, but in my family “sweet” is never an ironic 
word and pretty much amounts to the highest compliment. 
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among other things, “mass appeal” (“E Unibus Pluram” 173), it seems reasonable to not expect 
him to achieve universal popularity.  That observation leads to an interesting question of balance, 
though, because his project is to communicate a sincere message to someone.  Perhaps the effort 
to be sincere renders the question moot, however, because to be sincere the author has to be 
faithful to what feels true as well as put forward his or her best effort to communicate effectively, 
and those two demands may well just decide the whole issue.  What feels true to any one author 
is not going to feel true to every reader, after all.  My analysis of Infinite Jest is therefore 
necessarily based, at least in some respects, on my own subjective experience of reading it. 
 The overarching plot of the novel concerns the existence of a film entitled Infinite Jest 
but more often referred to as The Entertainment.
15
  The film is so singularly compelling that 
anyone who watches it becomes hopelessly addicted.  Unable to make a compromise between 
the desire to watch it over and over again and the need to care for their bodies, its viewers are 
pretty much invariably doomed.  The parallel between this fictional entertainment and real-life 
American television is obvious.  While the latter is not compelling enough to keep most people 
from getting up to visit the bathroom or show up to work, TV commands rapt attention to the 
point of encroaching on many Americans' time for sleep or exercise.  Wallace confessed to 
interviewers that he chose not to own a television, because when he had access to one he found it 
very difficult to not watch it habitually and compulsively, regardless of how inane the programs 
were.
16
  Of Infinite Jest the novel he told Rolling Stone that   
it's about the question of why am I watching so much shit? It's not about the shit. 
It's about me: Why am I doing it? The original title was A Failed Entertainment, 
and the book is structured as an entertainment that doesn't work...because what 
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 To avoid confusing the novel and the film, I will stick to calling the latter “The Entertainment.” 
16
 Untitled interview with ZDF, 2005 
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entertainment ultimately leads to is 'Infinite Jest,' that's the star it's steering by. 
(Lipsky 6) 
 Here Wallace uses the phrase “infinite jest” to indicate the promise of eternal light-
hearted fun that broadcast television promises the viewer in its encouragements to “stay tuned” 
for the next show, and the next, and the next.  The Entertainment is just the hypothetical ideal 
product of corporate-interest driven entertainment, a business in which programs must find a way 
to ensure as much watching as possible in order to be competitive for advertising revenue.  N. 
Katherine Hayles notes that the film represents an “ironic end point” (687) of American 
consumerist ideology in which individualistic prioritization of self-preservation, self-gratification, 
and personal choice results in a contradictory lack of self-determination and ultimately in self-
destruction. 
 Though not made for monetary gain, The Entertainment exists for another individualistic 
goal.  Its creator is James O. Incandenza (or “Jim”), who is all at once an alcoholic, tennis 
academy founder, optics expert, and filmmaker.  Hayles observes that Jim is “so inward-bent” 
that his children usually refer to him as “Himself,” as if he cannot be properly mentioned without 
an “intensifier of selfhood” (689).  It is no coincidence that this nickname implies an aura of 
distant mystery, because that is exactly what Jim is to Orin, his eldest son, and Hal, his youngest.  
Only the middle child, Mario, connects with his father through a shared obsession with film-
making that dominates the final years of Jim's life.   
 Jim is desperate to connect with Hal, a desperation intensified by frequent hallucinations 
that young Hal never speaks.
17
  The hallucinations themselves are perhaps evidence of Jim's 
                                                 
17
 Hal experiences an inability to make himself verbally intelligible to others later in his life, which will be 
addressed in more detail later.  While that later incident suggests the possibility that his father is not 
hallucinating, the hallucination theory still makes the most sense in this earlier scene because 1) there is never 
any mention of Hal ever having this problem with anyone besides Jim before his senior year of high school, and 
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intense preoccupation with himself.  In an early scene, Jim dons a disguise and pretends to be a 
so-called “professional conversationalist,” renting an office and sending Hal to an unexplained 
appointment.  The whole ruse reeks of insecurity, as the appointment seems to be more about 
Himself than helping Hal in any meaningful way.  It is as if Jim's hallucinations come out of an 
anticipation that Hal dislikes him, and he is pretending to be someone else in order to make sure 
that his son's silence is a general affliction and not something more personal.  At the beginning of 
the session, Jim can indeed hear what Hal says, and their conversation is revealing of Jim's 
extreme lack of parental attention to his son on an everyday basis.  “You're how old, Hal, 
fourteen?” he asks, to which Hal replies, “I'll be eleven in June” (27).  Just a few minutes later it 
dawns on Hal that the conversationalist is his own father, but as soon as he calls Jim out, Jim 
stops listening and begins to rant about all kinds of family secrets that are entirely inappropriate 
to share with a ten-year-old. 
 Included in this familial dirty laundry is the revelation that Jim “used to pray daily for the 
day his own dear late father would sit, cough, open that bloody issue of the Tucson Citizen, and 
not turn that newspaper into the room's fifth wall,” and further that he is tormented by his belief 
that he has “spawned the same silence” in Hal (31).  Jim's father was an alcoholic as well, 
apparently emotionally unavailable and self-absorbed.  Jim's perfectionism and overachieving 
tendencies may be seen as an effort to please his own distant father, and his parenting style is 
clearly inherited.  Hal in turn has inherited perfectionism and overachieving tendencies—perhaps 
partially out of a sense of guilt for the sense of personal failure that he embodies for Jim—as 
well as an addiction to marijuana in place of his father's alcohol. 
 Jim has a narcissistic streak, often seeming both self-obsessed and self-loathing.  All-
                                                                                                                                                             
2) Jim always seems to believe that Hal is utterly silent when Hal believes himself to be talking, whereas in 
Hal's later communication breakdown, others experience him as making bizarre animal noises. 
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consuming perfectionism, after all, comes out of a constant evaluation of one's efforts as 
consistent failures to meet an impossible standard, combined with a hope that one has the genius 
to meet that impossible standard.  It is fitting that the filmmaker creates the improbably-
compelling Entertainment with the hope that it will provide a way for him to connect with his 
son, only to never show it to Hal because it is “too perfect” (940) and for that reason a failure.  
Finally achieving perfection results in no satisfaction.  And Jim's idea of connection is not to 
become familiar with Hal's personal life, his emotions and experiences, but to make a film that 
will secure his son's attention and admiration.  The result of Jim's egoistic goal is an extremely 
dangerous piece of art.  After creating the film, the auteur himself has to resort to a slew of high-
tech brain implants.  A “gyroscopic balance sensor and mise-en-scène appropriation card and 
priapistic-entertainment cartridge” (31) work together to deliver to some part of his brain the 
Entertainment that it craves while leaving other parts free to continue operating his strange, 
tortured life. 
 Despite Jim's decision to not release the film, his work takes on a life of its own, 
“bringing the entire family, and indeed the nation, into imminent danger” as a group of 
Quebecois separatist terrorists seek it out for use against the United States.  Hayles writes that 
“the radiating consequences make clear that the scale of the problem exceeds family dynamics, 
encompassing international politics and ecological crises,” and points out that “in a large sense 
the culprit is no single person, family, or even nation, but rather an ideology that celebrates an 
autonomous, independent subject who is free to engage in the pursuit of happiness, a subject who 
has the right to grab what pleasure he can without regard for the cost of that pursuit to others” 
(691-2).   
 Infinite Jest shows this particular ideology in its extreme application in order to reveal its 
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absurd and terrible consequences.  In this respect the novel provides an ironic critique in the 
same style as Candide, resulting humor and all.  Sincerity and irony may appear to run counter to 
one another, given that sincere language speaks straightforwardly while ironic language says the 
opposite of what is meant.  The two terms are not antonyms, however, because behind them is 
the same intent to reveal truth, or at least not to deceive.  Sincerity wants to be recognized as 
sincerity, and irony wants to be recognized as irony.  For this reason a communication can be 
simultaneously sincere and ironic: sincere in that the message that it conveys comes from a place 
of deeply felt belief, but ironic in the language that it uses to create that message.  A work of 
New Sincerity, understanding that critique that is either solely plain-spoken or solely ironic will 
be ineffective in contemporary U.S. culture, embraces this fact and uses both communication 
strategies while also attempting to be open about this communication strategy.  Such art makes a 
concentrated effort to make the reader aware of the earnestness of its message, encouraging the 
audience to put aside cynicism in their approach to the artwork while not pretending that 
skepticism is without merit in the current cultural situation. 
 This rejection of the ideology of the autonomous individual in society distinguishes 
Infinite Jest from the traditional novel.  There are at least thirty-six characters in the work with 
names.  Some appear more often than others; Hal Incandenza and his family members, Don 
Gately, Joelle van Dyne, Remy Marathe and Hugh Steeply are the most prominent, with the lives 
of other characters in their varying relationships to these nine branching off into increasingly 
smaller subplots.  Though many of the characters never interact directly, their stories are all 
inextricably connected and each has some bearing on the work's overarching plot. This depiction 
of total inherent interconnection is a more accurate depiction of life in a modern society, in 
which every person is subject to the force of public opinion, habits, and beliefs, and in which 
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individual actions combine to create unintended economic, environmental, and political 
consequences that in turn affect individual lives.  Because the overarching plot of Infinite Jest 
concerns the fate of American society, American readers are encouraged to compare the nation’s 
real-life economic, environmental, and political trajectories with those portrayed in the novel. 
 Infinite Jest is actively engaged with literary theory.  An intended “failed entertainment” 
about a failed entertainment, it looks directly at the struggle of artists to communicate through art.  
Jim works obsessively throughout his twelve year career as a director, making around seventy-
five films.  It is hard to say exactly how many films, first because many of the projects end up 
unfinished, but also because, according to the filmography provided in one of the novel's 
footnotes, “certain of his high-conceptual projects' agendas required that they be titled and 
subjected to critique but never filmed, making their status as film subject to controversy” (985).  
Jim constantly changes the style of his work, inventing new artistic concepts and using his 
optical expertise to create original filming techniques and special lenses.  His work is never mere 
aesthetic representation, seeming to always attempt to affect the world—for example, one of his 
artistic periods is characterized by an attempt “to militate against received U.S. commercial-
prettiness-conventions” (743).  Still, he seems to hold himself back with over-intellectual 
acrobatics, using them as a way to keep a distance between himself and the subject matter and 
not commit to any really sincere messages.  Joelle van Dyne, a film student who forms a working 
friendship with him through her relationship with Orin, observes that his films are often 
characterized by “cold hip technical abstraction” (742).  She perceives his film The Medusa v. the 
Odalisque, for instance, to be “cold, allusive, inbent, hostile: the only feeling for the audience 
one of contempt.”   Joelle suspects that this is not due to a lack of emotional depth in Jim, 
observing to the contrary that he would often insert extremely fleeting, almost impossible-to-
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notice glimpses of sentimentality in his films, “like he couldn't help putting human flashes in, but 
he wanted to get them in as quickly and unstudyably as possible, as if they compromised him 
somehow” (741).   
 In general his films remind Joelle of “a very smart person conversing with himself” (740).  
Jim's films can be related to Wallace's concerns about art.  According to Wallace scholar Adam 
Kelly,  Wallace believed that fiction “should be viewed not primarily in terms of aesthetic 
representation, but of ethical intervention.”  Kelly quotes Jon Baskin's take on Wallace's concerns 
about art: “Modern art, [Wallace] believed, too often treated pain as corresponding to some 
existential truth, converted it into an abstraction, or glared at it for amusement.  Wallace's 
therapeutic art always treated pain as a symptom of distress, confusion and isolation.”  Baskin 
calls this tendency toward unhelpful abstraction “the plague of the irresponsible intellect” whose 
work passes on to its audience the implicit message that “the authentic contemporary subject, 
just like the real artist, sacrifices sincerity and fellow feeling for the deeper truths of abstraction, 
alienation and cynicism” (“Birth of a Discipline”).  For Wallace, art should necessarily be created 
with an eye toward helping the community it exists in, should attempt to help its audience 
manage the complex difficulties of existence, and not simply identify contradictions and 
suffering in order to show off the artist's cleverness. 
 Virtually all the characters in Infinite Jest suffer some type of pain and are looking for 
ways to deal with it.  Wallace depicts emotional pain as a major force behind the addictions 
which afflict virtually all of his novel's characters in some form.  Social isolation or discomfort 
in particular seems to make characters vulnerable to compulsive drug use, and there are 
numerous scenes that show individuals alone in private engaging in self-destructive behaviors.  
The impulse to self-destruction drives the desire to be isolated, and the isolation drives the desire 
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to self-destruct.  Modern society with its proliferation of private rooms make this cycle easily 
accessible if one has the impulse.  Ken Erdedy, for example, might not work himself into a 
frenzy over binging on marijuana if he were not all alone at home.  In fact, for a while his 
method of dealing with his binges is to ask each dealer to never sell to him again, a method that 
does not work because the structure of life in Boston allows him to simply find another dealer, 
and another one, and keep it all a secret. 
 It is not simply the presence of other people that Infinite Jest then suggests to be 
therapeutic.  There are several scenes depicting multiple characters on drug binges together, but 
their togetherness only consists in physical proximity.  Don Gately could save his friend and co-
worker Gene Fackelmann from being murdered, his dependence on heroin wins out, compelling 
him to sit down to binge with the doomed man instead.   Beyond just being together in the same 
room, Wallace suggests that the experience of empathetic connection is crucial to healing.  
Therapy groups like Alcoholics Anonymous, which the tenants of The Ennet House Drug and 
Alcohol Recovery House attend on a daily basis, are taught the importance of trying to identify 
(or “ID”) with other attendees' experiences.  These meetings are essentially story-telling sessions 
in which members of other AA groups come to share their personal experiences with addiction.  
In their emphasis on finding what is shared in the AA members' experiences, and in their 
communal experience of overcoming addiction in the meetings themselves, effective group 
therapy is depicted as essentially a facilitation of Erfahrung.  Infinite Jest shows empathetic 
connection through communication to be absolutely necessary to well-being.   
 Stopping going to meetings is a key factor in recovering addicts' slipping back into 
substance abuse.  “Boston AA stresses the utter autonomy of the individual member,” (356), and 
it is true that no one is forced to attend meetings or behave a certain way.  Yet the group seems 
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almost cultlike in the behaviors it suggests, behaviors in which members find they must engage 
in order to for AA to work for them personally.  “You have to want to take the suggestions, want 
to abide by the traditions of anonymity, humility, surrender to the Group conscience” to be 
successful with AA, which means trying to take seriously cliches like “one day at a time” or 
“easy does it,” praying daily to one's higher power of choice, and committing to attend meetings 
for life.  “It's all optional; do it or die” (357).  The reason why this model for recovery works is 
treated as a mystery, and the senior AA members laugh at the question, recognizing it as pointless.  
Wallace acknowledges that deciding what to believe is a major struggle for a conscious being, 
because it both theoretically possible to infinitely question the basis on which one knows 
something, and necessary to stop that line of questioning in order to choose a course of action.  
Boston AA calls the phenomenon of endlessly questioning reality “analysis paralysis” (203) 
because it creates an uncertainty that prevents any decisive action.  Through AA, Wallace shows 
that it is necessary for every individual to actively decide where in the line of infinite questioning 
to place faith in an answer in order to have a chance at self-determination. 
  Wallace tells Silverblatt that “fiction's got a very weird and complicated job because part 
of its job is to teach the reader, communicate with the reader, establish some sort of relationship 
with the reader where the reader is willing on a neurological level to expend effort” in order to 
understand what the author is trying to communicate.  Wallace scholar Adam Kelly writes that 
this view of fiction results in a “dialogic quality” to Wallace's work as he attempts all at once to 1) 
transcend the limits of written language, 2) make the reader aware of the difficulties created by 
those limits, and 3) convince the reader to commit the energy to understanding what he really 
means.  Kelly calls the resulting authorial strategy a “radical method for waking readers up to 
agency” (“Birth of a Discipline”) as a characteristic of Wallace's work and of New Sincerity art 
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in general.  By encouraging an engaged effort towards understanding both reading and the world, 
Wallace's work has the potential to change readers' lives, and therein lies its political significance.  
For example, the connections of the novel's fractal structure nurtures an alternative mode of 
perception from one of linear, obvious cause-and-effect.  This mode is helpful to achieve 
individual understanding of insidious, invisible effects of social systems like those discussed 
earlier in this paper, e.g. the significance of irony as a cultural norm, the interplay between 
corporate motives and human relationships, and so on. 
* 
 Wallace shares Colebrooks concern for the difficulty of ascertaining the sincerity of any 
message in a modern world full of ironic or empty messages, and understands that this 
uncertainty threatens an author's ability to communicate a message with full force.  According to 
Wallace, "there is, in writing, a certain blend of sincerity and manipulation, of trying always to 
gauge what the particular effect of something is gonna be” (Lipsky 24).  Because the presence of 
advertising trains Americans to expect motives behind messages, a writer may feel conflicted 
about trying to manipulate reception, and can find it a struggle to convince the reader that a 
work's message comes from a place of wholly genuine sentiment.  One way Wallace deals with 
the issues of irony, sincerity and communication is to discuss them throughout the novel and thus 
bring them to the reader's attention.  It is not hard to imagine parallels between Jim's struggle 
with his theoretical experiments and attempts at communication through The Entertainment and 
Wallace's own attempt to deal with those artistic problems in his novel. 
 Infinite Jest explores the difficulties modern subjects face in communicating themselves 
to others and achieving the necessary empathetic connection. Through AA meetings Wallace 
depicts a social environment that demands sincerity, because each personal story 
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can't be a calculated crowd-pleaser, and it has to be the truth unslanted, unfortified.  
And maximally unironic.  An ironist in a Boston AA meeting is a witch in church.  
Irony-free zone.  Same with sly disingenuous manipulative pseudo-sincerity.  
Sincerity with an ulterior motive is something these tough ravaged people know 
and fear, all of them trained to remember the coyly sincere, ironic, self-presenting 
fortifications they'd had to construct in order to carry on Out There, under the 
ceaseless neon bottle. (369) 
The question of the roles of sincerity and irony in communication runs throughout 
Infinite Jest as its different problems are explored in various characters, particularly the members 
of the Incandenza family.  Hal Incandenza suffers from an inability to achieve a congruence 
between avowal and actual feeling.  Though he has memorized the Oxford English Dictionary, 
he does not have much use for it in attempting to communicate himself to others because he is 
emotionally silent inside, and this profound emptiness is obscured to most other people by his 
impressive performance in academic and athletic pursuits.  His mother Avril’s explanation of her 
father to Hal’s brother Mario seems also pertinent to understanding Hal when she says that 
“certain types of persons are terrified even to poke a big toe into genuinely felt regret or sadness, 
or to get angry.  This means they are afraid to live.  They are imprisoned in something…frozen 
inside, emotionally” (766).  Later in the book when Hal experiences a sort of emotional 
awakening, his condition reverses.  He begins to forget much of his OED vocabulary and 
suddenly cannot match his facial expression or other body language to the feelings he is trying to 
communicate, causing other characters to think he is overcome with mirth about very sad things 
or grimacing instead of being friendly.  But while Hal was previously unaware of the 
incongruence between his inner world and outer expression, the reversal brings his attention to 
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the frustration of not being able to communicate himself as he quite earnestly but futilely 
attempts to convince others that “I am not what you see and hear…I have an intricate history.  
Experiences and feelings.  I’m complex…please don’t think I don’t care” (11-13). 
Wallace explores distinctions in motivations for sincerity through several characters.  One 
of these is Avril, who paradoxically is so committed to being open with other people that she 
somehow seems to become the most obscured to the reader, who receives very different 
interpretations of her attitudes and motivations from other characters.  Avril is obsessive in her 
effort to love her sons unconditionally and to not cause them any sort of trauma or self-esteem 
issues by displaying even the slightest amount of distrust or controlling behavior.  Despite her 
devotion to this style of parenting, her eldest son Orin resents her deeply and cuts off contact 
with her.  His childhood friend Marlon Bain points out that Avril’s parenting, which taken to 
extremes results in absurd decisions, may be more about “safeguarding…her own vision of 
herself as a more stellar [mother] than any human son could ever hope to feel he merits” (1051), 
comparing her to 
the sort of philanthropist who seems humanly repellant not in spite of his charity 
but because of it: on some level you can tell that he views the recipients of his 
charity not as persons so much as pieces of exercise equipment on which he can 
develop and demonstrate his own virtue.  What’s creepy and repellent is that this 
sort of  philanthropist clearly needs privation and suffering to continue, since it is 
his own virtue he prizes, instead of the ends to which virtue is ostensibly directed.  
(1052) 
 It is significant that the reader does not come away from the book with the message that 
Avril is exactly such a person as Marlon speculates.  Hal and Mario think of her in much more 
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positive terms, which does not discount the possibility that Marlon’s analysis is correct—they 
could truly be taken in by a false altruism—but also does not mean that their experience of her is 
less legitimate.  It is worth noting that much of the negative interpretation made of Avril’s 
“unimpeachable” (1050) behavior comes to the reader by way of Orin, whose version of all 
events is somewhat discredited by his sociopathic behaviors such as torturing Mario, lying 
pathologically but without an effort to be convincing, or methodically feigning insecurity and 
sincerity to seduce women whom he coldly thinks of as “subjects” (43).  There is also a strong 
suggestion that Avril is a survivor of child abuse and that perhaps her parenting behavior is not in 
any way intentionally self-serving but is a coping mechanism for emotional trauma.  The 
ambiguity of her character, which appears in some instances quite admirable and in others 
poisonous, leaves the reader with an understanding of the complexity of intent and motive in 
human relationships more than with any decisive judgment of Avril herself. 
Contributing to this and other ambiguities of the characters is the fact that the primary 
narrator of Infinite Jest is not totally omniscient.  Although this narrator possesses a great deal of 
information about the characters’ actions, thoughts and feelings, this information never seems 
enough to perpetrate the “invasion of the ‘he’” that Roland Barthes attributes to omniscient third-
person narration which gives the reader a full account of a character’s inner world.  Barthes calls 
such narration “a progressive conquest over the profound darkness of the existential ‘I’” (37) 
because it suggests that to each consciousness there is a sort of static true state that is potentially 
fully knowable.  Lacking full access to experiences besides one’s own, it is easier to conceive of 
others as consistently moral or immoral, well-intentioned or malicious, intelligent or not 
intelligent, and so on, whereas when thinking of one’s own self it is much easier to recognize the 
fluidity of one’s personality.  That fluidity is especially apparent to anyone who has felt that they 
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have been misinterpreted by others, or only partially understood.  Self-concept is in a significant 
way formed by one’s relationships with others and the self's perceptions of how others perceive 
it .  Instead of information that allows the reader to make definitive judgments of what kind of 
person each character “really is,” narration in Infinite Jest places its focus on illustrating the 
relationships between characters as they each uniquely perceive them.  The primary narrator’s 
lack of total knowledge is made conspicuous to the reader in occasional displays of ignorance of 
information that would in theory be simple objective fact in the real world.  For example, there is 
a scene in which the narrator demonstrates impressive awareness of the various whereabouts of 
many of the characters during Hal’s tennis match against Ortho Stice, including those of 
characters who are nowhere near the tennis academy, yet after disclosing many of their locations 
admits that “Avril Incandenza’s whereabouts on the grounds were throughout this interval 
unknown” (655). 
Besides the primary third-person narration, the reader of Infinite Jest receives the 
narrative in a variety of voices.  Hal gives a first-person narration which only begins at his 
emotional awakening.  Some sections are written as characters’ monologues or dialogues without 
any narration.  There are letters, magazine interviews, interrogation transcripts, Hal’s father’s 
extensive filmography, scene-by-scene descriptions of various films made by characters, 
academic essays written by tennis academy students and excerpts from sections of fictitious 
books that these essays quote, footnotes citing real and made-up sources, references to real and 
made-up commercial products and works of art, mathematical diagrams and formulas, and 
detailed chemical descriptions of various drugs.  Often information about a given character is 
received not from the narrator but through other characters’ retellings of that character’s story, 
making much of what is said unreliable.  Narration is sometimes in the past tense, sometimes in 
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the present, and constantly switches among three major intersecting storylines and the related 
side stories that they each branch off into.  Various events are not presented in chronological 
order, and because in the world of Infinite Jest years are not referred to by number but are named 
by commercial sponsors, aside from understanding the narrative as taking place in the not-too-
distant future, the reader cannot be sure when exactly in the future that is. 
 The fragmented style of the narrative has several effects that are not typical of the 
traditional novel.  Barthes points out that the preterite in novel writing calls for a “sequence of 
events…an intelligible Narrative” and in doing so “presupposes a world which is constructed, 
elaborated, self-sufficient, reduced to significant lines, and not one which has been sent 
sprawling before us, for us to take or leave” (30).  While there is an “intelligible narrative” (30) 
to Infinite Jest, it is not easily intelligible (requiring for most readers probably a couple of 
readings to discern without help) nor is it conclusive.  There are elements to it which remain a 
total mystery and are up to the reader to decide, for example the question of whether Joelle van 
Dyne is hideously deformed or overwhelmingly beautiful.  Presenting the narrative in a 
fragmented style prevents the reader from reading each section primarily for development of the 
overarching plot and an eye towards some final informational message.  Stranded without the 
context which can only be acquired from reading the entire book, the reader first reads each 
section for its immediate, self-contained significance, making his or her own connections and 
conclusions about events and characters.  This style of narrative gives the impression of both the 
intricate interconnectedness of human lives and a lack of any sort of master plan towards which 
these lives are connected.  Their tendency towards connectedness exists prior to and apart from 
any higher purpose which may be interpreted from those connections; the connectedness itself is 
what is significant. 
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 Infinite Jest renews the form of the novel by making its primary aim therapeutic, rejecting 
a belief in individual autonomy for an acknowledgment of humans' need for one another, and at 
the same time encouraging readers to actively engage with the world and claim agency.  As a 
piece of writing, it cannot create an actual instance of Erfahrung for its readers, and does not try 
to.  Instead, it attempts to guide the reader to his or her own understanding of connection with 
others as necessary to well-being, hoping that this could improve the reader's actual life with the 
understanding that “it's a lot easier to fix something if you can see it” (Infinite Jest 55). 
Conclusion 
Literature published after Infinite Jest that is most often discussed in relation to New 
Sincerity does not necessarily resemble Wallace's fiction formally.  For example, most of Tao 
Lin's novels are very short, and his prose style is a flat, brief deadpan that reads nothing like 
Wallace's often paragraph-length sentences.  Different writers feel different truths, and pursue 
whatever formal qualities they hope will serve to convey those truths sincerely.  Jennifer Moore 
suggests that whatever form New Sincerity writing takes, it necessarily risks the failure of its 
project, perhaps even fails inevitably, yet is not without merit: 
The idea of risking anything implies that what is being risked has a certain value; 
what’s  at stake for these writers seems to be the possibility of human expression 
in any form. The hazards involved with the divulgence of interiority 
(embarrassment, sentimentality, readerly critique) turn it into a necessity in which 
one is required to risk the self in order to produce art. But this risk reaches beyond 
simply aesthetic concerns and extends to the world of actuality: art becomes a 
social obligation with the capability of “making ourselves, and everything, better.”  
What is at stake, then, is not just poetic assertions of real emotion and human 
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value, but those emotions and values as lived in the world. 
 Perhaps, says Moore, New Sincerity writers embrace impossibility in their project, 
making use of “techniques of failure” to reveal the inadequacy of language and thereby, like 
Wallace, reminding the reader of the need to actively engage with the text to discover the 
intended communication.  Whether New Sincerity writing actually succeeds or fails in 
communication is a matter of both author and reader effort.  New Sincerity thus resembles 
conversation in its need for both parties' cognitive participation. 
Jason Morris notes a “messianic impulse inherent in the promise of a 'New Sincerity'” 
which might culminate in salvation from “all the threats of late-late capitalism.”  One of the most 
promising signs of New Sincerity's effect on American culture is what appears to be an increased 
openness among young adults towards alternatives to capitalism.  In the results of 2011 poll by 
the Pew Research Center, slightly more than half of Americans from ages eighteen to twenty-
nine expressed positive attitudes towards the idea of socialism, and negative attitudes towards 
capitalism.  On the left, there seems to be a recent resurgence in youth interest in political 
activism.  This resurgence is evinced by, among other things, youth participation in the Occupy 
movement (which was, notably, inspired by an Adbusters graphic), the 2006 revival of Students 
for a Democratic Society, and the flurry of political activity popping up on college campuses 
across the U.S. by organizers who see themselves as part of a global student movement, taking 
inspiration from peers in places such as Chile and Quebec.   I think it makes sense to connect 
these activities to New Sincerity sensibilities.  Activist communities provide nurturing spaces for 
young people to actually talk about what they value and to learn from one another.  The 
conversation in these spaces can be remarkably irony-free, and this community activity often 
amounts to a kind of therapy for youth who feel dis-empowered and demoralized by the cultural 
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situation they have grown up in.  And collective political action, for which people work together 
to achieve a goal they feel to be bigger than their individual selves, can be a form of Erfahrung.  
What this and other signs of New Sincerity will come to is yet to be seen, but they are promising 
in their efforts to perform transfiguring critique. 
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Figure 1 
Sierpinski triangle 
 
Source: Beojan Stanislaus, “Sierpinski Triangle,” Wikimedia Commons. 
<http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sierpinski_triangle.svg> 
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